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ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE FROM 
THE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Oliver J. Lissilzyn 
The controv('rsy he tween the United 
SLateR and the North Korean auLhorities 
('onsl'qlH:nt upon the seizure by the 
laLL('r of U.S,S. Pueblo on 2:~ January 
I ')(IB revolved in part around lJul'stions 
of facl. Th,~ North Korl'an aulhorili,!S 
ael'us('d Ill!' !'hip or delilll'r:1t,'ly in-
truding into the L!'rritorial s,'a c1ainu'd 
by them (apparently 12 miles in widLh): 
the United StaL!'s dl'nied thaL the ship 
had approached the North Korl'an ('oast 
so c1osl'ly, A t no Lillie, ael'ording to 
published data, have the NorLh Kon'an 
authorities asserted the right to seize Lhe 
ship on the ground that it had been 
('Ilgagcd in eleels lInie reconnaissance of 
North Korl'a while n'maining on the 
high t'cas. Abstenlion from making such 
a claim of right corn-sponds to Ill(' 
pa\l('rn of ('O/Hlud follow,'d in ,'0111-
par:1hlt- silualilln~ hy Ih,- Sodd Ilnioll.' 
Tlll'rt- i~. fllrllll'rmort'. no availahlt, ,·\,i-
eI"III'" Ihat lilt, Nmlh (\01"'0111 alllhorili,'~ 
hav,' formally I'w,'lainwd or c'~lahli~I\I'd 
oul~i(!t, IIII' L!'rrilorial S"iI "laimc,(1 h\' 
them a contiguous zone for security 
control of navigation. 
I t has, nevertheless, been suggested 
that there may he a Lrend in interna-
lional law loward Ih,' emergl'ncc~ of a 
righl 10 prodaim ilnd cnforl'e on Ihl' 
hi:dl s,'as ('olltiguous zonl's of un-
I'pl'(:i fit'd ex ten L for the: prcven tion or 
control of electronic reconnilissance by 
ron'ign vesspls, including warships.2 Al-
though furl her IcdlJlologieal proh'l'CSS 
mily make sueh reconnaissance less and 
less usci'ul, its utility cannot uc said to 
have already disappeared. Consequently, 
it seems appropriate to consider the 
extent, if any, to which such a trend has 
actuillly manifestl'd itself. 
I t is conCl'ivahle that under interna-
lional law a ('oastal staL!' could have at 
le'a,,1 Ilm'l' killel!' of rip:hls d"!'ip:nl'cI to 
"lIahl" il 10 pn'\','111 or 1'IIIIIrol fllf('ip:1I 
,'It'c'l rOlli,' \'I"'lIl1l1ai:-::-:anl'I' fro II I aeljlll'l'lIl 
art'a~ of Iht' high ~t'as: 
Fir:-:I. tlu: righL 10 prodaim COII-
tiguous zones in whieh il could forhid 
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all vessels, including foreign warships, to 
engage in electronic reconnaissance of 
any kind, with a concomitant right to 
enforce such prohibition by seizure and 
forfeiture of the offending ship and, 
possibly, imposition of criminal penal-
ties upon the ship's personnel. I n the 
Pueblo incident, the North Korean 
authorities seem to have, in fact, eo me 
close to enforcing the policy underlying 
such a possible right, without publicly 
enunciating or justifying it. 
Second, the right to proclaim con-
tiguous zones in which the collection of 
information about the coastal state by 
electronic means would be regarded as a 
violation of international law by the 
state engaged in such collection, but 
without the right to seize the foreign 
ships concerned. 
Third, the rip:ht to punish individuals, 
ineluding members of foreign armed 
forces, for engaging in ·forbiddcn elec-
tronic reconnaissance, in a contiguous 
zone of the high seas, when such indi-
viduals are apprehended within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the offended state. 
Such a right, hy itself, would probably 
be the least dfective safeguard of the 
intrn'st of tht' coastal stall' in con-
trolling elrclronic reconnais:::'\Il('t'. II 
could be combined, howevt'r, with the 
second type of po !'Sible right:::. 
But the statement that a state con-
ceivahly could have certain rights under 
international law docs not imply that it 
already has them or that there is a trend 
toward the emergence of such rights or 
that it is desirable for them to exist. 
Rules of international law usually re-
flect an accommodation of several in-
terests and rest on a consensus which 
can be formally manifested in a treaty 
or inferred from uniformities in the 
practice of states. What, then, arc the 
relevant existing or emerging rules? 
The most authoritative, though not 
uniwr:::ally hinliin~ in u formal !'('m;p, 
guidi'S to the rdevanl inlernational law 
of the sea today art' two (; 1'l1(wa Con-
venlions on the Law of thl' Spa 
concluded in 195B-tlll' Convention 011 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone and the Convention on the High 
Seas.3 Not all states-or even a majoritr 
of states-are parties to these treaties. 
In particular, North Korea, which is not 
recognized as a state by a large number 
of states, is not entitled to become a 
party to either of these conventions.s 
Nevertheless, since many of the provi-
sions of these treaties represent rules 
generally accepted by the international 
community, they are an appropriate 
starting point for an analysis of the 
relevant content of international law 
and of trends in it. 
Directly relevant to the question of 
establishment of contiguous zones for 
security purposes is article 24 of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
thl' Contiguous Zone, which reads as 
follows: 
1. In a zone of the high seas 
contiguous to its territorial sea, 
the coastal state may exercise the 
control necessary to: 
(a) Prevent infringement of 
its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
:-:anitary n'~lIlations within its 1er-
ritory or tcrriturial s('a: 
(II) Punish ill frillW'JII('llt of 
the ahove regulations commiLled 
within its territorial sea. 
2. The contiguous zone JIIay 
not extend beyond twelve miles 
from the basrline from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. 
3. Where the coasts of two 
states are opposite or adjacent to 
each other, neither of the two 
states is entitled, failing agreement 
hetwet'n them to the contrary, to 
ex teml its contiguolls ZOl1l1 h('-
yond the median linc l'vcry point 
of which is (~quidistant from the 
lIl'an~st Peints on tlll~ h<l~('lin('s 
frolll which the hn'adth of thl' 
LerriLoriul ~eas of Llw Lwo sLuLes is 
mcasured. 
IL will he noLed Lhut "!:ccurity" is not 
onr of the specified purpo~es for which 
contiguous zones may bc established. 
The omission is deliberate. The draft 
articles prepared by thc International 
I,aw Commission which formed the 
husis of the work of the 1958 Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea contained a 
provision similar to the first two sec-
tions of the finally adopted text of 
article 24. It did not contain lIny men-
tion of "sl'l'uritv" but al!:o olllilled till' 
word "imllli~r~tion.'·6 A t the Con-
ft'rencr, Poland proposed that pllrll~raph 
I of the arLicle he replacrd hy the 
following text: "In a zone of the high 
sl'as contiguous to its territorial sea, the 
coastal state Illay take the measures 
necessary to prevent and punish in-
fringcmcnts of its customs, fiscal or 
sunilary r~ulations, and violations of its 
security. " 
In thc First CommiLlee of the Con-
fl'rc~nce, whl're urnendments required 
only a simple majority, the Polil:'h pro-
pOl:'al was adopted, aftrr lillie reportrd 
di8cu~8ion, hy a votr of ~~3 to ~7, with 
15 ahstentions.s But in the ph'nury 
IIIrcting, whrrl~ u t\>'o-thirds majority 
was ncccssary, the proposal failed of 
adoption, receiving 40 votes against 27 
nrgative votes, with nine ahstcntiom:. 
I nsh'ad, the Conferencc adopted, by ()() 
votes to none, with ]:3 lIbstentions, a 
(I.S. propo~al which became thc text of 
urticle 24.9 Again, there was virtually 
no rrportrd discu~!:ion, and the name~ 
of the statt!S voting for and against the 
proposal are not listrd. 
Although the Polish proposal thus 
n'cl'ived a clear majority of the delega-
tions voting (though not of the H7 
dl'legations prrsrnt at the Conrt'renre), 
thr Im·k of a singlt' vote in oppo~ition t(} 
till' U.S. propol:'al suggesLs thut the 
I'l'ntinwnt in fu\'or of the Polil:'h pro-
pm:al was not a~ I:'trong m: the numhl'r of 
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vo\('$ cast for it might indicate. This 
impression is furLher horne out by the 
failure of any stute, upon signing, raLify-
ing, or acceding to the convention, to 
reserve its right to estahlish contiguous 
zones for security purposes, although 
numerous reservations have been en-
tered to other provisions of the conven-
tion. IO Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that numerous states, including Poland 
and the Republic of Korea, are not 
parties to the convention. 1 1 Some 
states, including Poland, have had provi-
sions in their national legislation for 
&'eurity zones in the adjacent areas of 
the high St·US. I2 It cannot be said, 
thereforc, that article 24, in limiting 
contiguous zont'S to the purpos(~s stu ted 
in it, has dedared or estahlish(·d a rule 
clearly applicable to states which are 
not parties to the convcntion. I3 But the 
evidence dors not indicate any trend in 
state practice toward cxpanding or 
strengthening claims of right to establish 
contiguous zones for security purposes. 
In particular, the authorities of North 
Korea do not appear to have proclaimed 
any such zones. 
t\rticll' 24 of the Convention on the 
Tt'rritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
contains .lIlother rdt'vunt limitation. It 
statrs that n l!ontigllous zoue "uUly not 
\·x It'ntl ht~yontl twt,lvr milt,s fl'Om tlll~ 
hal'c1ine from which the hrcmlLh of tlll~ 
territorial sea is measured." This means 
that a state which claims a territorial sea 
of 12 miles-as do the North Korean 
authorities-may not have a contiguous 
zone at all. Although this limitation has 
also been criticized by some writers, 1 4 
it appears to have encountered virtually 
no opposi Lion in the 1958 Con-
ference.1s But it cannot he said to be 
ahsolutely clear that iL applies to states 
which are not parties to the convention. 
But even if the pro\'it'ions on con-
ti~uous zones contnined in the Conven-
tion on till: Tt'rritorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone arc regarded as in-
applicable to states which are not 
partie:; to the conVt'ntioll, it docs not 
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foHow that they have a right to cnforce 
eontig;uous zones for security purpoi'es 
by seizing or otherwise interfering with 
foreign warships on the high seas. 
Article fl of the 195B Convention on the 
High Seas provides: 
1. Warships on the high seas 
have complete immunity from the 
jurisdiction of any state other 
than the flag state. 
2. For the purposes of these 
articles, the term "warship" 
means a ship belonging to the 
naval forces of a state and bearing 
the external marks distinguishing 
warships of its nationality, under 
the command of an officer duly 
commissioned by the government 
and whose name appears in the 
Navy List, and manncd by a crew 
who are under regular naval disci-
pline. 
The term "high seas," furthermore, is 
defined in article L as meaning "all parts 
of tIll' sea that are not included in the 
tcrritorial sea or in the internal waters 
of a state." Since article 24 of tIlt' 
Convention on the Territorial Sea aIHI 
the Contiguous Zone refers to "a zonc 
of the high seas contiguous to ... terri-
torial sea," it seems clear that the 
ahsolute immunity of warships provided 
in article fl of the Convention on the 
IIigh Seas extrnds to war:;hips within 
the contiguous zone of another state. 
This provision, moreover, mm;t he 
regarded as declaratory of general inter-
national law and applicahle to aH states, 
regardless of their being parties to the 
convention. The Preamhle of the Con-
vention on the lIigh Seas speaks of its 
provisions as heing "generally declara-
tory of estahlished principles of interna-
tional law." No such statrment appcars 
in <Illy of the othcr II)!)B Conventions 
on thc I.aw of the !-I('a. Arti('h' B, 
llIon'over, was mlopll'd without di:-:l'('nl. 
and no :;tat(~ has mad(, any n':;crvation 
with rr:;pect to it.16 
This view is supported uy the prac-
tice of states. Dei'pite the tensions 
associated with the cold war and similar 
political conflicts, states have generally 
refrained from claiming the legal right 
to interfcre with foreign warships or 
aircraft outside their territorial seas or 
territorial airspace, even when there 
were grounds for helieving that the ships 
or aircraft were engaged in electronic 
reconnaissance in close proximity to the 
territory of the coastal state. Partieu-
larly significant in this connection is the 
attitude of the Soviet Union in the U.N. 
Security Cou~cil debates concerning the 
shooting down hy Soviet planrs of U.S. 
Air l~orcc patrol aircraft. During such a 
ddlate in Scptemher 19;'4, after i'urh an 
aireraft had hcen shot down oVI:r the 
Sea of Japan, 
No participant ..• asserted or ad-
milled the right to shoot down 
r oreign reconnaissance aircraft 
over the high seas, no maLLer how 
closely it approached to the terri-
torial sea. Vyshinsky, the Sovict 
representative, stated: 
I\Ir. Lodge said that tlw Soviet 
Unioll rcprl$rntative wm; ap-
parently defcnding the right of 
the Sovict Union to shoot aireraft 
down ov('r the high seas. I f I\(' hm! 
not made his spc('ch in haste tl\('11 
I alll sure 1\1r. Lodge would not 
have said that, for my whole 
argument on this question was 
concentrated on proving that the 
incident involving the Soviet and 
United States aircraft occurred 
over Soviet territory and not over 
the high Sl'ilS. It is tl\('rrfore 
ahsurd to suggest that I could l)(~ 
defending tlw right of any State 
to shoot aircraft down over thc 
high seas. 
I t is olh('rs who wish to d('f('1111 
this ril!hl. We are Oppol'('d to 
it ... 17 
Very f:imilar was the dehate in Lhe 
Security Council in 1960 after a U.S. 
Air Force H.B-47 paLrol plane had been 
shot down by Soviet aircraft. Again, the 
Soviets charged the plane had intruded 
inLo Soviet airspace and disoheyed an 
order to land. None of the nations 
involved in the debate-including the 
U.S.S.R.-"claimed or admitted the 
ri~ht of a state to shoot down a foreign 
aircraft over the high seas, even if it flies 
within close proximity of the state's 
territory and even if it may he engaged 
in military reconnaissancc," although 
several representatives, including the 
SovieL, "suggested that flights close to 
the territorial sea of another counLry 
may be undesirahle as possihly leading 
to illcidl'nLs ..• " Indeed. LIlt' BriLish 
reprrsenLaLive, wiLhout conLradicLion, 
"expressly upheld the right to conduct 
such flights for reconnaissance purposes, 
and said that Soviet aircraft had engagcd 
in such flights wiLhout being shot 
down."!S And when North Korean 
forces shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121 
n'connaissance aircraft in April 1969, 
once more the alle~aLion was that it had 
inLruded inLo North Korean airspace.! 9 
IL Lhus appears Lhat the Sovietllnion 
and other Communist sLaLes or aUlhori-
tics have never officially claimed a right 
10 attack or inlerfere with forcign air-
craft over the high seas in proximity to 
their coasts, on the ground that such 
aircraft was, or could he reasonably 
suspected of heing, engaged in clee-
tronic reconnaissance. There is nothing 
to indicate, moreover, that foreign 
surface vessels, and particularly foreign 
warships, are in this respect considered 
to be different from forcign aircraft. 
And no staLe appears Lo have advanced 
the view that electronic reconnaissance 
from the high seas justifies an attack on 
Ihe ship or aircraft engagcd in iL as a 
matter of the coastal state's right of 
sci f-,Icfcn:::e. 
The record furlllt'r indicalt's Ihal 
~ovieL-hloc govcrnmenls do nol appear 
10 IHlve eVl'r offil'ially ass"rled Ilwl 
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electronic reconnaissance from the high 
seas is a violation of in Lt'rnaLional law . 
In this conlleclion, it is also signifieanL 
that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,2 0 
which is largely a product of negotia. 
tions heLween the Soviet Union and Lhe 
United StaLes and to which both staLes 
arc parties, contains no prohibition of 
miliLary reconnaissance from outer 
space. 
The analysis here presenLed, which 
indicates that there is no support in the 
official claims or views of states for the 
position that electronic reconnaissance 
from the high seas justifies an attack 
upon or interference with foreign ships 
or aircraft engaged in such reconnais-
sance, is, of course, limited Lo the 
relaLions of sLaLl~S aL pc:we with em:h 
other. It is obvious that in time of war 
enemy warships and military aircraft on 
or over the high seas may be attacked, 
whether or not they arc engaged in 
reconnaissance. The question whether 
the relations between the United States 
and the NorLh Korean authorities in 
196B and 1969 involved, despite the 
armi!;tice of I ()!'i;3, dements of hel-
ligerency and Lherefore gave the laLLer a 
right to <tLLaek U.S. warships and air-
craft engaged in c1eetronie reconnais-
sance from Ihe high seas or airspace 
ahove the high s,~as is ouL:;ide the senpe 
of Lhis article. North Korean authorities 
do not appear to have claimed any such 
right in cOllneeLion wiLh the seizun~ of 
the U.S.S. Pueblo or the shooting down 
of the EC-12I. 
It has been suggested thaL although 
"passive" electronic reconnaissance 
from the high seas may be permissible, a 
different rule mayor should <Ipply to 
"acLive" reconnaissance in which the 
observing ship or aircraft sends, for 
example, deceptive signals to create Lhe 
fal:,(, irnprcggion thaL iL ig within Lh(' 
tt'rritorial g,'a or air:'pal'e of thl' coastal 
,;tal(' for tlw Jlurpo",' of ((·"tilll! tl\(' 
latkr's reaclion lilllt'.2 J Although Ihi:; 
diglinclion llIay hm'(' lht'orelical nwril, 
il do('s not appt'ar 10 havt' 111'1'11 
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officially and publicly drawn by any 
state. 
The suggcstion that there mayor 
should he a trend in international law 
toward making electronic reconnais-
sance from the high seas unlawful, and 
permitting coastal states to establish 
contiguous zones to prevent it, is, in 
large part, based on the contention that 
such reconniassance operates unfairly 
against the smaller and weaker coastal 
states that do not have the capabilities 
to engage in similar reconnaissance 
activities off the coasts of the stronger 
states? 2 The record does not indicate 
that such a trend is already under way. 
First, the fact that on certain occa-
sions Some states or authorities (in-
cluding the U.S.S.R. as well as North 
Korea) have actually attacked or inter-
fered with foreign reconnaissance air-
craft or vessels {as in the case of the 
U.S.S. Pueblo) over or on the high seas 
has no significance with respect to the 
development of a new rule of law in the 
light of their failure to admit such acts 
or attempt to justify them in legal 
terms. They have, indeed, sought in all 
such cases to create the impression, 
through official statements, that the 
foreign aircraft or ships had violated 
their sovereignty by intruding into their 
territorial airspace or territorial sea and 
that the acts of interference took place 
in such airspace or sea. The failure to 
claim a legal right of interference with 
foreign vessels or aircraft on or over the 
high seas in such situations shows that 
the coastal states or authorities con-
cerned did not helieve that such a claim 
of right would be legally tenable or 
acceptable to the international com-
munity or, perhaps, in their own best 
interests. 
Second, the number of small states 
or entities that have committed such 
acts of interference appears to havl' 
been very small. The evilielll"e tlllll' fail~ 
to support the contention that small 
states in general have an interest in 
estahlishing a right to intl'rferl' with 
foreign ships or airf'raft engngl'" in 
e leclronic reeonnai~$al1l'e off thl'ir 
coasts on or over the high seas. 
Third, it is unlikely L1wt a new rule 
of law assumed to he beneficial to the 
smaller states will come into existence if 
the stronger states do not favor it. By 
hypothesis, the suggested rule would 
work to the disadvantage of the stronger 
states and therefore is not likely to gain 
their support. 
Fourth, there is no evidence that the 
international community today regards 
such a rule as desirable or that the 
sentiment in its favor is increasing. 
There remains the question of the 
right of the coastal state to impose 
criminal penalties on membl~rs of crews 
of foreign reconnai:-::-:anel' ships mill air-
craft for participation in intelligence 
gathering from the high seas if they arc 
subseqliently apprehended within the 
territory of the coastal state. One of the 
bases of criminal jurisdiction of states 
over aliens is the so-called "protective 
principle," which enables a state to 
prosecute and punish in its courts 
foreign nationals for eommiLLing nels 
abroad against iLs security. Although the 
scope of the principle is not well de-
fincd and its employment in practice is 
relatively infrequent, its existence is 
wid('ly rccol-(niz('d in 111l~ Iill'ralur(' of 
international law and is ren.:ctl:d in a 
substantial number of provisions in na-
tional pcnal laws. After World War I, the 
Frcnch Court of Cassation upheld its 
application in the French courts against 
foreign nationals such as a Spaniard who 
was convicted of a crime against French 
security committed during the war in 
Spain by maintaining correspondence 
with enemies of France.23 If this prin-
ciple is interpreted broadly, it can be 
applied to persons engaging in intelli-
gl'nce gathcring, by electronic or other 
III l'.1I1 1', from the high SI'<l!' or lwen from 
II\(' Il'rrilol"Y of anollll'r ~I:III'. Sill'" II 
hroad nppli~ation of thl' principlc. how-
ever, eould be regnrded as unrea!'onahle 
(dt'l'pile Llw Frt'l\l'h pn'Ceut'nls) mill 
un~uJlJlorlt'd hy eonsislenL !'lall' Jlme-
lit·I'. In a world in whil"h all LIlt' I'lrollW'r 
Jl0\\'I'rl' havt' mainlainl'd for a lOll!! linll' 
largt' inlt'lIigt'nct'-galht'ring t'sluhlit'h-
nwnls, a lihl'rul uJlpliealion of Lhe "pro-
ll'l'liV!''' principlc would (~x pO!'e a suh-
slanlial number of individuals lo erimi-
nul pcnalties and would probably work 
to common disadvanlage. 
Tlw fm:l lhaL Lhe persons accur;cd of 
violuling lht' security of llw co.lslul sluLe 
hy e1l'dronie reconnaissance aded in 
llw prrformanct' of lheir oCficiul dUlies 
Ut' mililary personnel or government 
rlllployet's is anolher factor lo he con-
!'idcred. There arc old preeedenls for the 
view lhuL soldier!' invading the Lcrrilory 
of anolher slale ill lime of peuce cannol 
bt' madc pcrsonully Iiablt' hy lhc lallcr 
for the acls of violence lhey eommiL in 
lhaL lerrilory pursuunl 10 ordt'rs;24 huL 
in rt't'clIL y('urs a numher of uirmen 
arriving in inlruding foreign military or 
!'lalt~ uireraft haVI' bc('n prosccull!d and 
punished for llw inlrut'ion wilhouL 
giving rir;e lo the complainl lhaL such 
exercise of jurisdiclion is unlawful 
solcly 011 the ground lhuL thcy had 
acled in the performance of official 
duly.25 All lhese cases, however, huve 
involved ehurges of inlrusion rUllwr lhan 
reconnuis..<;unce from the high seus. 
Tlwr(! uJlpears lo he no pn'e('denl for 
proseculion hy a t:ouslul slull! of foreign 
mililury or olher governmenl personnel 
for lhe latter lype of aCLivity. The law 
in lhis maller eannol hc rcgurtled Ut' wcIl 
sl'lllrd, hut lhc official stalus of such 
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personnel is .1 weip;hL in Lhe hulunee 
ugainsL lhc rrasonublencss ulld lawful-
ncss of such proseculion. Also, lhe 
possihilily of such proseculion ufler Lhe 
apprehension of the personnel con-
cerncd wi thin the lerriLory of the 
coastal slale cannoL hc regarded us an 
rfft'clive !'aJl('lion uguinsl elt'dronic 
rt'connaist'unce. This is slill mlOlhl'r 
fa('[or 10 hl~ consith'rt'd in weighing mul 
haluneing LllI' inll'resls involvl'd. 
Apl'rt'ht'nsion of lilt' uceusI'd I'l'rsons 
wilhin the lerriLory of lhc coat'lul t'lale 
afll!r volunlary ('Illry inlo iL i!' noL likdy 
10 III! u frl'lllll'nl ot'(:lIrn'lll:l', and LIlt! 
I'lllploynll'nl of Ilris hust! of jllrisdic:lion 
would he haplwzurd, lhrowing furllH'r 
doubL on ils reasonableness. All in all, it 
muy he concluded lhat inlernalionallaw 
docs and should prohibit proseculion by 
a coastal state of foreign military or 
other government personnel for elec-
tronic reconnaissance from the high 
seas. 
Allhough inlernalional law docs noL 
forbid eleclronic reconnaissance from 
the high seas and docs not empower the 
coastal slale lo inlerfere with foreign 
wurships or aircraft engaged in iL, such 
reeonnaissunce is likely lo IH~ resenLed 
hy co as luI slutes and Lo heigh len inLer-
nuLionul tensions. I t should he resorled 
to, therefore, only if careful sludy 
indieules that ils co!'ts are substanlially 
oULweighed by ils benefils lo the staLe 
Lhat cnguges in iL. The Iwed for il may 
d('C\irw wilh the furlher dtwdo(lnlt'nL of 
olher means of sllryC'iIIanee "nd inldli-
~t'n(·(' ~alh('rjn~. 
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